‘Pietas et Veritas’, ‘Faith and Justice’ and the place of the Study of Humanities in Jesuit Education

Miguel Pedro Melo, SJ

School of Theology and Ministry,
Boston College
frmelo@bc.edu

Abstract

‘Pietas et Veritas’, ‘Faith and Justice’ and the place of the Study of Humanities in Jesuit Education

This paper argues that the understanding of social justice that emerges both from the texts of Vatican II and the writings of Fr. Pedro Arrupe, SJ, is a humanistic understanding that wants to open a via media for the dialogue between faith and culture. This fact requires not only a commitment with a justice that brings faith and culture to a closer dialogue but also an expansion of the concept of social justice beyond the precincts of sociological reflection and human activism to a more broad, literary and holistic form of humanistic education.

Keywords: Pedro Arrupe, Education, Humanism, Social Justice, Faith.

Resumen

‘Pietas et Veritas’, ‘Fe y justicia’ y el lugar de Estudio de las Humanidades en la Educación Jesuita.

Este documento sostiene que la comprensión de la justicia social que emerge de los textos del Concilio Vaticano II y de los escritos del padre Pedro Arrupe, SJ, es un entendimiento humanista que quiere abrir una vía media de comunicación para el diálogo entre la fe y la cultura. Este hecho requiere no solo un compromiso con
una justicia que lleve la fe y la cultura a un diálogo más cercano, sino también una expansión del concepto de justicia social más allá de los recintos de reflexión sociológica y activismo humano hacia una forma más amplia, literaria y holística de educación humanista.

Palabras clave: Pedro Arrupe, Educación, Humanismo, Justicia social, Fe.

Introduction

Between January 5th and March 22nd of 1995, 202 Jesuit delegates gathered in Rome to participate in the 34th General Congregation of the Order. Their goal was not to elect a new Superior General for the Order, as it usually is, but, in the words of the General Fr. Peter Hans Kolvenbach to The New York Times, to grapple “with the question of how to pursue the order’s mission of faith and social justice with a declining number of priests.”

From the decrees of the Congregation I would like to turn our attention to decrees three and four, about the mission of the Society of Jesus in regards to Justice and Culture. From both relationships emerged two sets of binaries: faith and justice, faith and culture. About the first, the General Congregation affirmed: “In response to the Second Vatican Council, we, the Society of Jesus, set out on a journey of faith as we committed ourselves to the promotion of justice as an integral part of our mission. (…) The promotion of justice has sometimes been separated from its wellspring of faith. Dogmatism and ideology sometimes led us to treat each other more as adversaries than as companions. (…) Every Jesuit in his ministry can and should promote justice. (…) [Thus], forming “men and women for others” is appropriate not only in our educational
institutions but in ministries of the Word and the Spiritual Exercises, in pastoral apostolates and communication.” (nn. 1-2, 19-20)

On the binary ‘faith and culture’ the Congregation said: “In recent years, the Church has made this theme [culture] one of its central points of reflection. Pope Paul VI wrote that “the split between the Gospel and culture is without a doubt the tragedy of our time.” More recently, Pope John Paul II has presented incul- turation as one of the fundamental aspects of the Church’s total evangelization mission. (…) Inculturating the Gospel means allowing the Word of God to exercise a power within the lives of the people, without at the same time imposing alien cultural factors which would make it difficult for them truly to receive the Word (…) [because] there is no authentic search for God without an insertion into the life of creation.” (nn. 2-3 and 6) Acknowledging that the source of inspiration for this mission statements can be found in the Second Vatican Council, this paper wants to suggest a reordering of the two above-stated binaries. Instead of affirming the two binaries as parallel vectors of the Society’s mission, I will argue for an integration of the promotion of justice within the binary: faith and culture.

Before entering into the argument, I want to leave here a quick sample of the idea I will defend by looking at the book of Joe Holland and Peter Henriot, SJ called: Social Analysis, Linking Faith and Justice. In the Preface, both authors criticize right wing thinkers for not being opened to a creative transformation of culture as well as left wing thinkers for not being opened to the spiritual roots from which creative energies can emerge and transform culture. This analysis seems to me very fair. Although, there is one critique I would like to make. Both authors associate openness to
creative transformation as a matter of justice and the openness to the spiritual sources as faith. Now, I agree that the spiritual sources can represent faith understood in a broad sense, a sort of a *Gestalt*; however, the creative transformation of culture, although it can be operated through justice, finds its goal in the transformation of culture more than in justice. Thus, the most fitting association would be between openness to creative transformation and the reshaping of culture through justice, as well as between the openness to spirituality and a faith that does justice. Conversely, the two sets of binaries should be framed in the following way: justice is bound to connect faith and culture.

In an era when some members of the Church appear to be the sole defenders of the integrity of faith and others of the respect for the yearnings of modern culture, can justice become a bridge that articulates both faith and culture in a renewed way? And if that is so, voicing the question of Alasdair MacIntyre, whose justice? Is justice only a matter of social justice, a matter of a public justice which has to be translated from its religious sources to a secular language perceived by all, as Habermas would say? Or are the religious roots of justice an essential element for allowing a genuine dialogue and contribution to culture, as Charles Taylor would argue? This paper will defend not only that faith can be (re)connected to culture by means of justice, but also that the concept of justice will have to be broad-

1 Furthermore, if we consider the studies of Johan Galtung on the levels of violence in society (direct, systematic and structural), we realize that habits of injustice generate a culture of structural violence. Thus, the instauration of justice is supposed to remove all levels of violence from the culture. Once again, the ultimate object of justice is the transformation of culture.
ened from the precincts of activism to a status of a new humanism.

Having clarified this framework, I want to present now the steps we will give in order to defend this argument. Firstly, I will expose how the first companions adopted a theology which bounded together the spiritual yearnings of their culture and the orthodoxy of faith by adopting the humanistic synthesis of pietas et veritas. Secondly, I will start by contextualizing the Jesuit promotion of justice within the broader task of engaging in a dialogue with atheism, entrusted to the Society of Jesus by Pope Paul VI in May 7 of 1965. From this step, we will conclude that, if for the first Jesuits humanism was the link between faith and culture, the concept of justice should be broadened and understood as the Society’s new humanism. Conversely, this understanding should renew the way in which our educational institutions articulate social engagement with the studia humanitatis.

I. Pietas et Veritas in Jesuit Humanism

1) The First Jesuits and "the undeniable progress of the Renaissance"

“Y ansí se determinó de ir a París a estudiar.”

With these words, the Autobiography of Ignatius of Loyola gives us an account of the resolution of the Pilgrim – name that Ignatius used to refer to himself – to finish his studies of Theology in Paris. "Solo y a pie,”

alone and walking, Ignatius goes to Paris and makes an important decision right away: “Pusóse en una casa con algunos españoles, y iba a estudiar humanidad a Monteagudo. Y la causa fue porque, como le habían hecho pasar adelante en los estudios con tanta prisa, hallábase muy falto de fundamentos; y estudiaba con los niños, pasando por la orden y manera de París.”

This decision of Ignatius of integrating the curriculum of Paris – “la orden y manera de París” – does not reflect a simple desire of self-development, but had sounding theological and pastoral implications.

During the time Ignatius of Loyola and his first companions were in Paris (1528-1535) there were three categories of theologians: (1) those who, like Beda Noel, considered all innovation as heretical; (2) those who, like Erasmus, wanted to reconcile the spiritual yearnings of the faithful believers with the dogmatic and sacramental authority of the Church; (3) those who, like the Socianists and other groups who were at the roots of movements such as Quietism and Pietism, pursued a “pure” encounter with God, rejecting all which, according to them, did not integrate into this vision. According to Philippe Lécrivain SJ: "Ignatius and his companions were to be ranked neither in the first nor in the third categories, but in the second, the one which took account of the undeniable progress of the Renaissance.”

3 “He found lodging in a house with several Spaniards and began studying the humanities at Montaigu. The reason why he did this was because they had made him advance through his studies with such great haste that he found that he was without a good foundation. He went to class with young lads and made progress according to the prescribed curriculum of Paris.” Ibid., 73.

the “undeniable progress of the Renaissance” that the early Jesuits took into account?

In order to answer this question, we will explore the concept of ‘Jesuit Humanism.’ Only then shall we consider the disputes between the above-mentioned theologians and explore the consequences of the theological position of the first Jesuits in their schools.

2) On the concept of ‘Jesuit Humanism’

It is in the context of a Humanistic revolution that the First Companions engage in their studies in Paris. Just like Italy, though under a different pedagogical structure, Parisian Universities were integrating a new

5 How can this educational model be characterized? This model can be characterized by two aspects: its Christian influence and its articulation between Pietas et Veritas, Piety and Truth. Differently from Classic Humanism, Renaissance Humanists were Christians. This factor made them articulate the normal subjects of a Humanistic curriculum with Christian doctrine and theology. This articulation resulted in a stressing of the theme of human dignity. As for the articulation between Piety and Truth, we have first to acknowledge how the universities of this time were more focused on the refinement of arguments and on the pursuit of truth through a contemplative life, than the formation of an upright character, ready to enhance an active life with persuasive skills and a good character nurtured by the reading of the classics and of history. Thus, by finally incorporating the Humanist curriculum in Universities (Arts Faculty), humanists were able to balance the pursuit of Veritas with the nurturing of Pietas, thereby reordering the scope of the studia humanitatis, which were now recognized as skills to aid professional advancement.

6 In Italy, Universities were organized around and by students who hired teachers, and elected rectors from among themselves. In France, Universities were organized around and by teachers, and rectors were elected from among the teaching body. See P. F. Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 2-5.
Miguel Pedro Melo, sj

model of the *studia humanitatis*. Ignatius must have felt the changes of this humanistic revolution at Montaigu when, to the ordinary method of teaching (*lectio et disputatio*), recitations of lessons (*repetitio et expositiones*) and public dramatic presentations during feast days were added to the curriculum.⁷

Furthermore, these innovations were also entering into the Faculty of Theology, to the wearisome of theologians like Noel Beda. For him, it was unacceptable that some professors of Greek and Hebrew, who were qualified in literature but not in theology, would teach Scripture. Wouldn’t this undermine the value of the Vulgate’s translation of the Bible? On the other side of the dispute, the controversial Steinmetz argued that ignorance about the classical languages by biblical professors would make the study of the Scripture become sterile.⁸ It is in this context that the early Jesuits were exposed to the *studia humanitatis*.

After 1540, already graduated from the University of Paris, the first companions moved their headquarters to Italy, where boarding schools had already been operating with a humanistic curriculum for at least a century. Later on, when in 1548 the Jesuits opened their first school in Messina, Sicily, they progressively started a vast network of schools around the world that would intentionally opt for a humanist curriculum. As a matter of fact, the very next year Jeronimo Nadal prescribed a humanistic curriculum for the young boys of the new school in Messina.⁹ This curriculum would

⁸ Ibid., 142-3.
merge the Italian program of *studia humanitatis* with the *modus parisiensis* in which the first companions were formed.\(^\text{10}\)

This merging of these teaching models, the Italian and the French, would assume *pietas* as its main goal. This primacy would offer an enough wide goal for an educational system which welcomed both Jesuit man in formation and lay students. Two examples of this primacy can be clearly found in two texts of the early Society. Firstly, Nadal who have said that: “everything is to be arranged so that in the pursuit of these studies *pietas* holds first place.” Secondly, Juan de Polanco, Saint Ignatius’ most prominent secretary who, in order to clarify the motives for Jesuits to study *cosas de hu-manidad* (things of humanity), wrote the following reasons: (1) humanities help in the understanding of the Scriptures; (2) humanities is, traditionally, propaedeutic to philosophy; (3) humanities nurture skills in communication which are fundamental for Jesuit ministries in general.\(^\text{11}\)

However, for the First Jesuits, this emphasis on *pietas* did not discarded by any means the importance of receiving a rigorous formation (*veritas*). What it stated was that *veritas* should be at the service of *pietas*, of that which is pious, which would be the service of God within the Church, and not of one’s own glory. However, *pietas* does not eliminate the importance of *veritas*. A clear


example of this can be found in the fifth chapter of the fourth part of Jesuit Constitutions. Firstly, Ignatius offers a principle of *pietas* focusing the goal of studies in the help of souls according to circumstances of times, places and peoples.\footnote{“Siendo el fin de la doctrina que se aprende en esta Compañía ayudar con el divino favor las ánimas suyas y de sus próximos; con esta medida se determinarán en universal y en los particulares las facultades que deben aprender los Nuestros, y hasta dónde en ellas deben pasar (...) insistiendo con más diligencia en la parte que para el fin dicho más conviene, attentas las circunstancias de tiempos, lugares y personas, etc., según en el Señor nuestro parezca convenir a quien el cargo principal tuviere.” (Ignacio de Loyola, “Constituciones de la Compañía de Jesús,” *Obras de San Ignacio de Loyola* [Madrid: BAC, 1997], 540-541).} Secondly, he balances this goal by asserting how, according to the discernment of the Superiors, Jesuits in formation ought to study what is sound and approved by the Church (*veritas*).\footnote{“La doctrina que en cada facultad deben seguir, sea la más segura y approbada, y los auctores que la tal enseñan; de lo qual tendrán cuidado los Rectores, conformándose con lo que en la Compañía universal se determinare a mayor gloria divina.” Ibid., 541.} But which were the reasons for Jesuits to opt for this balance between *pietas* and *veritas*?

Following J. O’Malley, I think that this Humanistic balance between *pietas* and *veritas* derived from two factors which were determined by the religious commitments of the Order: (1) a call to interiority which, according to the *Spiritual Exercises*, should help to emerge in the student a person of discernment; (2) an emphasis on promoting the obedience to rules and church discipline. These factors help us to return to our initial question: why taking into account the “undeniable progress of the Renaissance” did help the First Jesuits to be ranked as the second type of theologians? Because the balance between *pietas* – which was the main goal of Socianists,
concerned with a “pure” encounter with God – and veritas – the main focus of Noel Beda’s concern for orthodoxy – was strongly articulated by a humanistic model which was concerned both with the spiritual yearnings of culture (pietas as formation of a person of discernment) and the obedience to the dogmatic and sacramental authority of the Church (veritas as promotion of the obedience to rules and church discipline). Thus, our first conclusion is that the Humanistic framework of Pietas et Veritas helped the First Jesuits articulate the yearnings of culture and the principles of Catholic faith.

II. The dialogue with atheism and commitment with justice

1) Second Vatican Council and the dialogue with atheism

Between 1962 and 1965 many Catholic bishops and theologians, together with other laypeople and Christians from other denominations, gathered together in Rome for an Ecumenical Council. As many authors have affirmed, the documents of this Council operated a real rhetorical shift in the Church with sounding theological and pastoral implications. Thus, the Church abandoned the rhetorical path of excommunications and adopted one of dialogical engagement. In order to adopt this path, the Council returned to “the great themes and issues present in the Humanistic tradition from its inception, themes and issues that were

baptized by the Humanists of the Renaissance.” Furthermore, the Humanistic Renaissance and the Council shared a mode of operating: the wish of going back to the classical and spiritual sources of the past in order to better accommodate the new aspirations of culture. Because of this, authors like John O’Malley have gone so far as to describe Vatican II as a Humanist Council.\textsuperscript{16}

In this sense, if Vatican I was concerned with the dialogue between faith and reason, and thus was more doctrinal than pastoral, Vatican II was concerned with the dialogue between faith and culture and thus was more pastoral than doctrinal. It is in this pastoral and humanist sense that the Council addresses the commitment with justice as a matter of viewing the relationship between faith and culture. This integration of the commitment with justice, in the form of accepting the social implications of faith, within the dialogue between faith and culture can be illustrated in three examples: (1) Fr. Alberto Hurtado, French labor-priests and Fr. Ignacio Ellacuría; (2) Fr. Henri De Lubac; (3) Fr. Pedro Arrupe. For Alberto Hurtado, the French labor-priests and Ignacio Ellacuría, champions of justice in their own times, injustice was a sign of a culture which was not yet transformed by faith. This can be testified in their respective writings: “¿Es Chile un país católico?” (A. Hurtado), “La France est-elle encore un pays catholique?” (French labor-priests), and “História de la Salvación” (I. Ellacuría).\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16}Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{17}“We could eventually think that the spearhead of history can be found in the peoples that were more influenced by Christian faith, especially in its protestant version. However, this self-complacent view shocks with the actual state of humanity, so strongly condemned by Gaudium et Spes from Vatican II or by Populorum Progressio of Paul VI, as well as by Medellín and Puebla.” (Ignacio Ellacuría, His-
Whereas for Henry de Lubac, the rise of Marxism, among other factors, was to be explained by a form of Catholicism which placed salvation within individual precincts, forgetting the communal historicity of the City of God. Finally, Fr. Arrupe, when addressing the Conciliar Fathers in 1965 affirmed that it is not enough for the Church to ask for a personal conversion of the faithful without calling for a concrete transformation of culture by all believers. More than an intellectual solution, the fundamental remedy to deal “with the evils which sprang from atheism and naturalism today lies in the formation of a Christian society, not as a separate entity – a “ghetto,” as they say – but as a reality in the midst of men, a society possessed and animated by a Christian community spirit.” Thus, the commitment from believers with the world seems to be driven by the desire of faith to transform culture.

We can conclude then that the separation between faith and culture can be perceived in social injustice (Alberto Hurtado, French labor-priests, Henri de Lubac, Ignacio Ellacuría) and that a social engagement rooted in faith is the fittest way to remedy disconnection between faith and culture (Henri de Lubac, Pedro Arrupe) together with the two worst consequences of


this disconnection: structural poverty and intellectual or practical atheism. This understanding was present in the minds of the Conciliar Fathers, has it can be attested by the reading of *Gaudium et Spes* 21.

2) *Fr. Pedro Arrupe and “education for social change”*

In July 31st of 1973, Fr. Pedro Arrupe spoke to the 10th International Congress of Jesuit Alumni of Europe gathered in Valencia, Spain. It is in this occasion that Arrupe, pointing out to the need of educating for social change, coins the famous expression “Man-for-others.” The main argument of the Basque Jesuit was that a new vision of justice did emerge from the conciliar texts as well as Papal Encyclicals and the Synod of Bishops of 1971. A new vision that was not included in Jesuit Education previous to the Council. Therefore, a new educational model had to be found, so that Jesuit Educational Institutions could form men and women for whom personal conversion is not enough. Rather, following the image of Jesus Christ, they are to be men and women for others who “cannot separate personal conversion from structural social reform.”

One central point to Arrupe is to point out that justice is not an end in itself, because the Church’s mission is broader than that, although it includes its pursuit. In his words: “the mission of the Church is not coextensive with the furthering of justice on this planet. Still, the furthering of justice is a constitutive element of that mission.”

21 *Ibidem.*
the mission of Jesuit Education is to transform culture by forming people who want to be devoted to the service of others, who want to become more human themselves and humanize the situation of others as well as the culture they live in. This transformation of a culture imbedded in a practical atheism, through a commitment with justice, was the central point of Arrupe’s allocution to the Conciliar Fathers in September 27 of 1965 that we did mention above.

As a matter of fact, the dialogue with culture in general and with atheism in particular was one of the most significant missions entrusted by Pope Paul VI to the Society of Jesus on May 7th of 1965. This mission was so significant to Arrupe that it was one of the most important topics of his personal Spiritual Exercises in 1965. As the Jesuit Joseph Munitiz points out, Arrupe saw this papal injunction against atheism “as the new great mission of the Society.” But, why did Arrupe gave such an importance to the dialogue with atheism? In his Spiritual Exercises he comments: “This activity,

22 “Dehumanization of ourselves and dehumanization of others. For by thus making egoism a way of life, we translate it, we objectify it, in social structures.” Ibidem.


understood in all its depth, breadth and complexity, is the great force that can help to a true Reform [using this term with reference to the ‘Reform’ of the sixteenth century] and restructuring of the Society, as well as to a raising of its spirit.” To this quotation, Munitiz adds: “He is convinced that the situation in 1965 has much in common with that faced by the Society at the time of the Counter-Reformation.”

However, if the first Jesuits were able to articulate orthodoxy (faith) with the spiritual yearnings of their time (culture) through the studia humanitatis, did Arrupe think of justice as a humanist value to articulate faith and culture in our time? In his words in Valencia, Arrupe affirmed: “Men-for-others: the paramount objective of Jesuit education – basic, advanced, and continuing – must now be to form such men. For if there is any substance in our reflections, then this is the prolongation into the modern world of our humanist tradition as derived from the Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius.” Thus, we can conclude that, in the same way that the first Jesuits articulated faith and culture by adopting the humanistic synthesis of pietas and veritas, also by interpreting the call for justice that emerges from the conciliar documents within the mission of dialoguing with atheism entrusted to the Society of Jesus, justice emerges as a new humanism meant to articulate both faith and culture.

III. Justice as a new Humanism

1) Whose Justice? The Exercise of ‘Seeing, Judging, and Acting’

---

26 P. Arrupe, Aquí me tienes, Señor, cit., 39.
27 J. A. Munitiz, Here You Have Me Lord, cit., 69.
In April 23, 2010, Adolfo Nicolas, General Superior of the Society of Jesus, offered some Remarks for “Networking Jesuit Higher Education: Shaping the Future for a Humane, Just, Sustainable Globe.” In this conference he used the model of contemplation of the Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius as a template for engaging, studying and transforming reality through Education. For him, the “depth of thought and imagination in the Ignatian tradition involves a profound engagement with the real.” This method consisted in looking over reality, reflecting over it and deciding the best course of action to transform it. A method that, besides being drawn from the sources of Jesuit spirituality, had also the advantage of being congruent with the model of analysis adopted by the Social Teaching of the Church: see, judge, and act.

This method will allow students to rediscover universality from reality itself as well as uncovering deeper answers to problems that require a response from the fullness of our humanity (spiritual and imaginative resources as well as the ones of social sciences). The reference to spiritual and imaginative resources for analyzing reality, invites the reader to broaden the sense in which s/he perceives the quest for justice as a mere activist pursuit. It requires an understanding of justice that values: (1) the lived experiences of social commitment one has in the first person; (2) the witnessing one receives by being in contact with people in situations where injustice is operative in culture; (3) the

humanistic sources of imagination and narrative reflection, where characters are presented as iconic figures\textsuperscript{29} of a particular social and/or spiritual situation that needs to be recognized, judged and transformed; (4) the schemes and insights with which social sciences analyze culture; (5) the social means of action that are available for engaging in a cultural transformation and those social means of action which are lacking.

In these lines, the justice that emerges from faith has to engage reality in order to transform it with depth. Thus, justice cannot receive a shallow definition of a mere activism but has to be perceived and proposed in Educational Institutions as a spiritual exercise and a method of deep social transformation of culture. Once more, justice is presented as that which entwines faith and culture, according to the desire of the Council. Now, how can we integrate this triadic method (see, judge, act) with the above mentioned five aspects of justice (lived experiences, witnessing, humanistic sources, social sciences, social means of action)? And, why is it reasonable to name this integration of method and aspects as a form of Humanism?

\textsuperscript{29} I would like to explain here the meaning of the expression “iconic figures.” Drawing from François Dagognet’s work, \textit{Ecriture et Iconographie}, Paul Ricoeur affirms that painting is not a photographic reproduction of the world but an articulation of minimized and simplified signs that can be perceived as an evocative presence. This effect is called “iconic augmentation.” In this manner, “iconicity is the rewriting of reality.” Likewise, writing “is a particular case of iconicity. The inscription of discourse is the transcription of the world, and transcription is not reduplication, but metamorphosis” which allows us to derive an universal mode of action from a character situated in a particular space and time. (P. Ricoeur, \textit{Interpretation Theory} [Texas: Texas Christian University Press, 1976], 40-3.
2) Which rationality? Imagining Justice as a new Humanism

According to the Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan, a method consists in a platform for creative collaboration. Therefore, it is not difficult to assume in theory that the five aspects I did mention above can be integrated in the triadic method of Catholic Social Teaching. The question then is more practical than theoretical. That is the question I want to engage now.

In *Mater et Magistra* John XXIII affirms that the process of *Seeing, Judging, and Acting* is a way of reading and responding to the signs of the time (culture) with the eyes and means of faith: “There are three stages which should normally be followed in the reduction of social principles into practice. First, one reviews the concrete situation; secondly, one forms a judgement on it in the light of these same principles; thirdly, one decides what should be done in order to implement or/and potentiate these principles. These are the three stages that are usually expressed in the three terms: observe, judge, act.”

(A) Reviewing the Concrete Situation – (1) Lived experiences of social commitment one has in the first person: It is not enough for students to learn about a reality without having a tangible contact with it, either by going to the concrete reality of study or by engaging in an analogous reality. This experience, before being submitted to any sort of analysis with academic

---

tools, has to be fully received by exercises of individual and group self-examination, remembering what one has witnessed and the feelings, attitudes and desires it has awakened or vanished in face of the perceived situations. (2) **Witnessing of the people who live in those situations where injustice is operative in culture:** Collect the testimonies given by the locals about the concrete reality, welcoming with respect and engagement the voices of those who face reality from a social position or existential circumstance from which the average student does not.

**(B) Forming a Judgement** – (1) **Humanistic sources of imagination and narrative reflection:** The reading of Classic and Religious texts, especially Christian or Monotheistic, is an essential vehicle to foster a deep human understanding of justice, one that comprehends the whole person, since it can orient the students towards justice with their imagination and affection, introduce the quest for justice within a cultural and personalistic perspective, and develop one’s character by proposing meaningful models of perceiving human action.32 (2) **Schemes and insights with which social sciences analyze culture:** This moment should be composed by three acts: reading, relating, repositioning.33 Firstly, it is important to read all the existing data on the topic or reality of study, in order to consider the already existing information in its fuller and deeper extent. Secondly, it is central to relate the material that


33 The expressions relating and repositioning are words of the American Pedagogue Michael Apple which I use here with the same meaning he employs in his work: *Educating the “Right” Way: Markets, Standards, God, and Inequality*, (New York & London: Routledge, 2006).
were read together with the outcomes of the previous steps (personal experience, witnesses of the locals, humanistic sources and values) in order to engage critically and creatively the continuities and discontinuities. Thirdly, it is important to be able to reposition that perception of reality or social mediation that needs to be adjusted in order to transform culture.

(C) Deciding a Fitting Course of Action – *Consider and choose those social means of action which are available for engaging in a cultural transformation and recognize those social means of action which are lacking.* This moment is so practically connected with the particular situation of each Educational Institute that there is not much to be said here. The only important points to mention are: (1) the decision process has to be crafted in a manner that can help students to increase their human capabilities for engaging in a discernment according to the basic principles offered by the Spiritual Exercises; (2) the outcome of the decision should take in deep consideration not only the demands of reality in its most universal scale but also its articulation with the guiding principles of the Gospel, namely: to love God and the neighbor as oneself.

Finally, we have to ask ourselves: is it reasonable to name this integration of method and aspects a form of Humanism? As we have said in the beginning of this paper, the term Humanities “derives from the Italian Renaissance and its promotion was called the *studia humanitatis* - which we might freely translate as literature dealing with what it means to be a human being. That literature consisted in the Greek and especially the Latin works of poetry, oratory, drama, and history that, when proper-
ly taught, were believed to develop an upright, articulate, and socially communicated person.”34

Our inclusion of personal experience and the value of witnessing is not at odds with the main goal of humanities, which is to provide the student with a profound acquaintance with that which is related to humanity. As for the social sciences, they represent a particular move of the study of humanity that, although not capturing the fulness of human reality, offers us a particular and important way for systematizing human data that enriches our perception of humanity with greater accuracy. Given all this, I consider this articulation to be worthy of being called a humanistic approach to justice as a manner of forming upright students, willing to transform culture by being opened to the spiritual roots of human tradition.

**Conclusion**

By understanding the binary ‘Faith and Justice’ under the light of Vatican II’s mission of dialoguing with atheism, this paper argued for an understanding of justice as the bridge between faith and culture. Not based on a narrow understanding of justice, which would reduce it to a mere praxis of social activism, but conceiving it as a holistic pursuit, one which engages the whole person: empathy, imagination, reason, and action, together with others and among fair institutions. This humanistic bond between the orthodoxy of faith and the aspirations of culture is congruent both with the writings of the early Jesuits as well as with post-Second Vatican Council Jesuits. Now, however this congruence with tradition might be important, why do I

34 J. W. O’Malley, *How Humanistic is the Jesuit Education?*, 189.
insist so much on the importance of integrating justice within a Humanistic program? Why and for what?

There has been, in the last years, a vast amount of literature on the impact of the studying of Humanities over society, from authors like Martha Nussbaum to Earl Shorris among many others. However, within the relationship between faith and culture, the importance of conceiving justice as a form of humanism is first and foremost a concern for depth. One of the realities which can be perceived in our current age is the emergence of populist leaders or factions not only in civil society but also within the Church. This emergence brings along something that we can call a ‘dictatorship of superficiality’ which can taint not only visions of what a culture should be but also of what faith and doctrine mean and represent.

In this sense, if justice is to be the connector between faith and culture, it has to be a humanistic or deeply humane justice. A justice that emerges from a deeply received tradition as well as from a deep perception and engagement with the reality of our modern culture. If there is a struggle for justice in our world, if there is a faith worth of being linked to culture through justice, if there is a culture that should be transformed by an integral faith through means of justice... than that justice has to be a form of humanism or it won’t be justice at all.

References

Id., Discurso del P. General S.J. Pedro Arrupe en el Concilio (27 de Septiembre de 1965), available at:
Pavur, C. “Classical Humanism has Everything to do with Justice” *Electronic Antiquity* XIII, 1 (November 2009).